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ARE JUDGES TIED TO THE PAST?
EVIDENCE FROM JURISDICTION CASES
Shay Lavie *

Do past decisions bias judges? This Article argues that judges
might be unduly affected by previously spent judicial efforts. Appellate
courts, for instance, are more reluctant to reverse a case if the trial
judge invested a large amount of resources in coming to a decision.
To provide empirical evidence for this proposition, this Article
examines reversal rates of jurisdictionalquestions. As jurisdiction is
independent of the merits, its resolution should not be affected by
subsequent judicial efforts on the merits. Nonetheless, this Article finds
that the more resources that are invested on the merits of the case, the
less likely appellate courts are to reverse the underlying jurisdictional
determination. This correlationis statistically significantand non-trivial
in size.
This Article then discusses the normative implications of this
phenomenon. The major implication is reforming the final judgment
rule. A broader right to interlocutory appeals would moderate
appellate judges' tendency to rely on past proceedings and improve
decision-making.
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[R]easonablecaution is needed to be sure that mooted litigation
is not pressedforward.. . solely in order to obtain reimbursement of
sunk costs.
- Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp.'
[A]rgumentfrom sunk costs [to the judicialsystem] does not
license courts to retainjurisdictionover cases in which one or both of
the partiesplainly lack a continuing interest.
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services,
2
Inc.
I.

INTRODUCTION

A defendant raises a preliminary defense. The trial court denies, and
proceeds to the merits. The defendant loses on the merits, then appeals
and reiterates the same preliminary defense. Upon ruling on the
preliminary defense, is the court of appeals influenced by the
judicial efforts that the trial court has spent on the merits of the case?
While this may be a common intuition,' this Article is the first to provide
empirical evidence.4
Though this phenomenon has far-reaching implications for the
appropriate design of the appeals process, there has been no attempt to
find evidence of the implication. The absence of empirical evidence
stems from severe methodological difficulties. Judges may appear to be
influenced by prior decisions, but in fact, large efforts spent on previous
decisions indicate better decision-making. In the context of appeals,
1. 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990).
2. 528 U.S. 167, 192 (2000).
3. See, e.g., Rafael Gely, Of Sinking and Escalating. A (Somewhat) New Look at Stare
Decisis, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 89, 110-13 (1998) (arguing that judges assign excessive weight to past
decisions when deciding whether to deviate from a precedent); Goutam U. Jois, Stare Decisis Is
Cognitive Error,75 BROOK. L. REV. 63, 86, 88-89, 96-97, 135 (2009) (asserting, in the context of
precedents, that "the way we humans make choices strongly suggests that we are inclined to choose
existing arrangements, not because they are preferable but merely because they exist"); Kevin J.
Lynch, The Lock-In Effect of PreliminaryInjunctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 779, 803-04 (2014) (positing
that when a judge denies a preliminary injunction based solely on the plaintiff's failure to show
likely success on the merits, a "lock-in" effect is created); Robert L. Scharff& Francesco Parisi, The
Role of Status Quo Bias and Bayesian Learning in the Creation of New Legal Rights, 3 J.L. ECON.
& POL'Y 25, 34-36 (2006) (stating that judges tend to stick to the current status quo); see also David
E. Cole, Note, JudicialDiscretionand the "Sunk Costs " Strategy of Government Agencies, 30 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 689, 693-95, 724-25 (2003) (claiming that courts take into account irrevocable
investments previously made by agencies to avoid waste of public finds).
4. Relevant literature has found a "status quo" bias, indicating that judges tend to stick to
their own prior determinations. See, e.g., Magnus Sdderberg, Uncertainty and Regulatory Outcome
in the Swedish ElectricityDistributionSector,25 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 79,83, 90 (2008).
5. See, e.g., Gely, supranote 3, at 106-07.
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longer adjudication at the trial court might be taken as a proxy for a
better judgment, hence leading to fewer reversals. A proper research
design, then, should focus on the influence of previous judicial efforts
that are irrelevant to the quality of the decision.
This Article introduces such a design. It relies on the distinction
between jurisdiction determinations and decisions on the merits. As will
be explained in further detail, jurisdictional questions typically possess
several unique characteristics: they are essential to adjudication; a lack
of jurisdiction mandates dismissal; the parties cannot waive or create
jurisdiction by consent; and jurisdiction is decided at the outset of the
litigation. 6 In short, jurisdictional determinations are independent of the
merits. They should not be decided differently due to subsequent judicial
efforts on the merits. Therefore, a correlation between reversals of
jurisdictional questions and judicial efforts on the merits can indicate
that appellate judges are unduly influenced by past decisions.
Against this backdrop, I created a database containing 375 appellate
court decisions in which the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction was
challenged. An analysis of the database reveals that jurisdictional
determinations that were followed by a bench or jury trial are less likely
to be reversed. In contrast, jurisdictional determinations that are
followed by a non-trial judgment are reversed more often.7 Therefore,
the findings demonstrate that the more judicial efforts spent on the
merits, the less likely the appellate court is to reject the trial court's
jurisdiction. This correlation is statistically significant, considerable in
size, and robust under various specifications. 8 It suggests that many
denied appeals should have been accepted.
Having found this evidence, this Article proposes several
modifications in legal procedure to cope with this phenomenon. 9 The
most effective strategy would be to avoid the very situations in which a
mistaken determination is followed by additional judicial efforts. This
can be achieved through reforming the final judgment rule, as a broader
right to interlocutory appeals prevents the accumulation of unreviewed
judicial efforts. This Article delineates the possible scope of such
interlocutory appeals, relying on examples of interlocutory review from
class certification decisions and orders compelling, and refusing to
compel, arbitration. Finally, the Article addresses alternative readings of
the empirical findings. What if judges say "jurisdiction," but really mean

6.
7.
8.
9.

See infra Part ILI.A.
See infra Table 1.
See infra Part IV.B-C.
See infra PartV.
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something else? Should a different concept of jurisdiction be adopted?
Can the findings be explained by trial judges' and/or litigants' behavior?
Part II sets forth the theoretical framework.' 0 Part III discusses the
methodology," and Part IV describes the results. 12 Part V suggests4
3
normative implications. Part VI discusses alternative explanations,
5 The Appendix presents statistical data.' 6
and Part VII concludes.1
II.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This Article examines whether appellate judges are influenced by
the mere efforts of trial judges, however irrelevant those efforts may be.
Why should appellate judges care about irrelevant efforts previously
spent on a case? What makes appellate judges committed to the path
taken by trial judges?
The behavioral literature addresses a similar phenomenon,
identified as the "sunk-cost," "entrapment," or "escalation of
commitment" effect. 17 While decision-makers should disregard fixed,
already-incurred, and irrelevant costs when deciding to move forward, 8
people often do take these costs into account. 9 Some of the reasons the
literature provides for this phenomenon seem relevant to the judicial
context. The following are the three main relevant explanations.
The first is cognitive biases; people simply tend to justify a
previous course of action.20 It has been noted that: "[I]ndividuals have an
almost uncanny ability to bias facts in the direction of previously

10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part 11.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part V.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See infra Part V11.
16. See infra Part VIII app.
17. Itamar Simonson & Barry M. Staw, DeescalationStrategies:A Comparisonof Techniques
for Reducing Commitment to Losing Courses ofAction, 77 J.APPLIED PSYCHOL. 419, 419 (1992).
18. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 1051, 1124
(2000). The same wisdom-avoiding fixed costs that were incurred when deciding to move
forward-is associated with some popular aphorisms such as "don't cry over spilled milk" and "you
can't tum back the clock." RICHARD A. IPPOLITo, ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS 116 (2005).

19. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 18, at 1124. In an illustrative experiment, it was found that
people ate less when they received a refund for an "all-you-can-eat" lunch, compared to those who
had to pay for it themselves. RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 11, 12 & n.8

(1991). For additional examples, see Gely, supra note 3, at 96 & n.24.
20. See Barry M. Staw & Jerry Ross, Behavior in Escalation Situations: Antecedents,
Prototypes and Solutions, in 9 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 39, 53 (L. L. Cummings & Barry M. Staw eds.,
1987) [hereinafter Staw & Ross, Behavior in Escalation].
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accepted beliefs and preferences.",21 The magnitude of this phenomenon
varies. Individuals with high self-esteem, for instance, tend to be more
committed to their original decisions.22
This explanation can be relevant to the judicial context. Indeed,
previous experiments have found that federal judges are not immune to
cognitive biases.2 3 Nonetheless, in the context of appeals, where one
judge reviews a course of action taken by another judge, the cognitive
explanations seem weaker.24
The second explanation is social; decision-makers desire to
26
25
rationalize their actions to others, and to not appear wasteful.
Similarly, when social norms favor consistency, the commitment to the
past is stronger.27 The greater the need to justify decision-making, the
more likely a losing course of behavior will persist.28 Those who
are politically vulnerable, for example, are more likely to suffer from
this phenomenon.29
This explanation seems relevant in the judicial context. It also
pertains to appellate decision-making, to the extent that wastefulness and
inconsistency (or the appearance thereof) reduces litigants' and the
public's confidence in courts. 30 The greater the need to justify judicial

21. Id.
22. Id. at 49. When the behavior has been entered into freely and publicly, the binding effect
is heightened. Id.at 52.
23. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 801-03,
808-10, 813-14 (2001) (finding several cognitive biases among federal district and magistrate
judges).
24. Indeed, the commitment effect is reduced-but not eliminated-when subsequent
decisions are made by different decision-makers. Jerry Ross & Barry M. Staw, Organizational
Escalation and Exit: Lessons from the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, 36 ACAD. MGMT. J. 701,
726 (1993); see also Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124, 134-35 (1985); Brian H. Bornstein & Gretchen B.
Chapman, Learning Lessons from Sunk Costs, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. APPLIED 251, 264
(1995) (showing that, in some situations, bifurcated decision-making is nonetheless more prone to
errors).
25. Ross & Staw, supranote 24, at 717.
26. Arkes & Blumer, supra note 24, at 125, 132; Bornstein & Chapman, supra note 24, at
252-53; see also Hal R. Arkes & Peter Ayton, The Sunk Cost and Concorde Effects: Are Humans
Less Rational than Lower Animals?, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 591, 598-99 (1999).
27. See Staw & Ross, Behavior in Escalation, supra note 20, at 58-59.
28. Id. at 55-56.
29. Ross & Staw, supra note 24, at 717 (discussing business and political pressures faced by
companies).
30. In the same vein, it has been argued that reversing a decision might generate a new-and
inconsistent-decision, which could have the effect of "introduc[ing] misgivings about the judicial
system that will undermine its legitimacy." Qian A. Gao, Note, "Salvage OperationsAre Ordinarily
Preferableto the Wrecking Ball": Barring Challenges to Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 2369, 2389 (2005); cf Jois, supra note 3, at 79-80, 92-94 (explaining the theories of
"judicial legitimacy" and "system justification," which point to reasons "why individuals support
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decision-making, the stronger the inclination to commit to
prior decisions.
The third explanation is organizational-due to administrative
inertia, deviating from a heavily invested course of action yields friction
and is less likely to occur. 31 This explanation seems relevant in
the context of appellate decision-making. In particular, proximity
among judges might hinder appellate judges from nullifying their fellow
judges' efforts.
With this background for the reasons behind appellate judges'
reluctance to deviate from a heavily invested prior course of action, the
next Part discusses the methodology taken to test this observation.
III.

METHODOLOGY

There are, then, various reasons that make appellate judges more
likely to affirm prior decisions in which the trial judge put considerable
efforts, regardless of the quality of the lower court's decision. While
some supportive anecdotal evidence of such practice may exist, 32 this
Article makes a more rigorous inquiry.
One can look for a correlation between reversals and judicial efforts
at the trial court. However, such a correlation is not a reliable piece of
evidence. Rather, it may reflect an alternative phenomenon: larger
judicial efforts at the trial level can indicate that the trial judge had a
better factual knowledge of the case, and/or achieved a more accurate
legal judgment. Appellate judges would thus consider larger judicial
input at the trial level as a proxy for a more accurate and well-informed
decision.33 Prior efforts, then, are not independent of the outcome.
Hence, the research design should focus on prior judicial efforts that do
not improve decision-making. This is the methodological difficulty that
this Article seeks to overcome by delineating the distinction between
jurisdictional and merits decision-making.

and prefer the existing system, even when doing so appears to do more harm than good" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
31. Staw & Ross, Behavior in Escalation, supra note 20, at 59-63; see also Keiko Aoki et al.,
Effects of Prior Investment and PersonalResponsibility in a Simple Network Game, 13 CURRENT
RES. SOC. PSYCHOL. 10, 18-19 (2007); Arkes & Blumer, supra note 24, at 134-35.
32. See, e.g., Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 55-56 (2d Cir. 2004) (denying a
"substantial" claim due to, inter alia, the fact that "significant (and probably non-duplicable)
judicial resources [were expended]"); see also sources cited supranotes 1-3.
33. Note, though, that this logic implies that trial judges might over invest in the case in order
to signal a more accurate decision and lower the odds of reversal. Cf RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 569-73 (7th ed. 2007) (noting the common perception that judges are
eager to clear their dockets).
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A. Jurisdiction Versus Merits
In order to find a correlation between reversals and irrelevant
judicial efforts at the trial level, this Article suggests a methodological
innovation: focusing on questions of subject matter jurisdiction. The idea
is simple: jurisdiction is independent of the merits. No matter how much
work a trial judge invests on the merits, these efforts have nothing to do
with the quality of his or her jurisdiction determination. Hence, appellate
judges should disregard the merits when they review the trial court's
jurisdiction ruling.
The sharp doctrinal distinction between jurisdiction and merits is
well grounded. Subject matter jurisdiction only "delineat[es] the classes
of cases ...falling within a court's adjudicatory authority. 34
Typically, questions of jurisdiction are purely legal ones, and do not
require factual inquiry. 35 They are also decided at the outset, before
evidence is proffered and the merits are discussed.3 6 Thus, the trial court
has no comparative advantage vis-e-vis the appellate court in
determining jurisdiction.37
Most importantly, jurisdiction is an essential requirement to
adjudication. Appellate courts cannot rely upon ambiguous jurisdiction
determinations of the trial court, regardless of the decision on the
merits. 38 As has been stated by the Supreme Court: "Without jurisdiction
the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to
declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining
to the court is ...dismissing the cause., 39 Theoretically, at least, a want
34. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004). Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as "the
extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 931 (9th ed. 2009).
35. See, e.g., Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 452-53.
36. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 91, 93-95 (1998) (deciding an
Article III standing jurisdictional question, Justice Scalia forcefully condemned the doctrine of
"hypothetical jurisdiction," i.e., adjudicating the merits before deciding the preliminary
jurisdictional dispute); Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Ry. Co. v. Swan, Ill U.S. 379, 382
(1884) ("[T]he first and fundamental question is that ofjurisdiction.").
37. The trial court may ask for evidence, such as additional affidavits, to resolve the
jurisdictional dispute. See, e.g., Phoenix Consulting, Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 40
(D.C. Cir. 2000). In any event, extensive factual inquiry on the merits has no bearing on prior
resolution of questions ofjurisdiction. See id.at 40-41.
38. See, e.g., Craig v. Ont. Corp., 543 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Subject-matter
jurisdiction is so central to the district court's power to issue any orders whatsoever that it may be
inquired into at any time, with or without a motion, by any party or by the court itself."); Phoenix
Consulting, lnc., 216 F.3d at 41 (reversing and remanding on the jurisdictional determination,
notwithstanding the resources invested in discovery).
39. Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868); see also United States v. Tran, 234
F.3d 798, 807 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Where the district court acted without subject matter jurisdiction, this
Court does not have the discretion not to notice and correct the error; it must notice and correct the
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of subject matter jurisdiction is never a harmless error.4 ° Considerations,
like the amount of work invested in the proceedings or in subsequent
litigation, should not matter to the appellate court, even when the result
on the merits is clearly correct.4 As the Supreme Court cautions, an
"argument from sunk costs [to the judicial system] does not license
courts to retain jurisdiction over cases in which one or both of the parties
plainly lack a continuing interest....
Acquiring jurisdiction is crucial, and the timing of raising the
argument against it is unimportant. Notably, "[i]f the court determines at
any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss
the action. ' A3 Moreover, "[a] litigant... may raise a court's lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction at any time in the same civil action, even
initially at the highest appellate instance." 44 Litigants are also free to
invoke federal jurisdiction and, upon losing, raise a jurisdictional
defect.45 More generally, jurisdiction is independent of the parties' will.
error.").
40. See, e.g., Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317 (1988); see also cases cited
supra note 36.
41. See generally Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567 (2004). In Grupo
Dataflux, a partnership sued a Mexican corporation in federal district court under diversity
jurisdiction. Id. at 568. At the very moment at which the complaint was filed, the parties were not
diverse, but soon afterwards they were. Id. The defendant did not raise jurisdictional challenges at
first. See id. After three years of pretrial motions and discovery, followed by a six-day trial, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the partnership. Id. at 569. Before entry of judgment, the defendant
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The Supreme Court held, in a
five to four decision penned by Justice Scalia, that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and
the case was dismissed. Id. at 568, 581-82. The quality of the result on the merits, and the fact that
the jurisdictional flaw cured after the case was filed, did not matter. 1d; see also JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 340-41 (rev. 9th ed. 2008)
[hereinafter FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE I]; Gao, supra note 30, at 2371 ("Regardless of
the time and resources that the parties and the court have expended, a finding of lack of subject
matter jurisdiction ... requires a dismissal.").
42. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 192 (2000)
(footnote omitted).
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
44. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443,455 (2004); accord GMAC Commercial Credit LLC v.
Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 357 F.3d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 2004) ("Any party or the court may, at any
time, raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction."); Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
126, 127 (1804) (holding that the lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the case
should have been dismissed, although the jurisdictional claim was raised only on appeal). For a
criticism of this long-standing rule, as well as a proposal for an alternative rule barring tardy
jurisdictional challenges, see Gao, supra note 30, at 2404-07.
45. See Am. Fiber & Finishing, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP, 362 F.3d 136, 142 (1st Cir.
2004). The court reasoned:
There is admittedly something unsettling about a party bringing a case in a federal court,
taking the case to final judgment, losing, and then invoking a jurisdictional defect that it
created-with the result that it escapes from the judgment and returns, albeit in a
different venue, to relitigate the merits. But the federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction and their institutional interest in policing the margins of that jurisdiction is of
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345

The court cannot deny a jurisdictional challenge because a litigant
intentionally and strategically chooses to raise it at a later point.46 Being
such a fundamental requirement, a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
may even justify, in certain situations, a collateral attack after the
original proceedings are over.47 Finally, an inquiry into subject matter
jurisdiction should be raised by appellate courts sua sponte, even absent
48
any contention to the trial court's jurisdiction.
Though one may doubt their wisdom, these strict rules of subject
matter jurisdiction are well entrenched in American legal tradition.4 9
Indeed, courts sometimes enforce these rigid rules while simultaneously
lamenting the resulting inequitable and inefficient outcomes. 50 In one
extreme example, the defendant raised a successful jurisdictional
challenge only after a jury verdict in the plaintiffs favor. 5 1 The Eigth
Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment by stating the following:
Despite our holding, we note the [defendant's] failure to raise the
motion earlier has resulted in delay, expense to appellees, and waste of
judicial resources. Nonetheless, because "[s]overeign immunity ... is a

jurisdictional prerequisite which may be asserted at any stage of the
proceedings,... [a] Court simply cannot ignore arguments, however
the Court's authority to exercise
belated, that call into doubt
52
jurisdiction over [a] matter.

greater concern than any perceived inequity that may exist here.
Id. at 142-43.
46. See Wight v. Bank Am. Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 90 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[l]rrespective of how the
parties conduct their case, the courts have an independent obligation to ensure that federal
jurisdiction is not extended beyond its proper limits."); United States v. Leon, 203 F.3d 162, 164 n.2
(2d Cir. 2000); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE I, supra note 41, at 339; see also Gao,
supra note 30, at 2390-92 (discussing additional cases where courts looked beyond manipulative
behavior of the parties to determine whether jurisdiction was proper).
47. See United States v. Kerley, 416 F.3d 176, 178-79, 181 (2d Cir. 2005); FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE I, supra note 41, at 248-49, 341-42.
48. See Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455; FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 1,supra note 41,
at 339.
49. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998); Kerley, 416
F.3d at 181.
50. See, e.g., Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d 1040, 1042-44 (8th Cir.
2000).
51. Id. at 1042.
52. Id. at 1044 (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Miramon, 935 F. Supp. 838, 841 (E.D. La.
1996)). In another illustrative decision, Diaz-Rodriguez v. Pep Boys Corp., the First Circuit Court of
Appeals nullified a summary judgment decision due to a jurisdictional defect that was not raised by
the losing party at trial. 410 F.3d 56, 62 (1st Cir. 2005). In a footnote, the court cited language from
one of its previous opinions:
There is something faintly inequitable about a party letting a case go to judgment without
questioning the court's jurisdiction, losing, and then profiting from a jurisdictional defect
noted sua sponte by the appellate court. ... [However), federal courts are courts of
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Put differently, the federal courts' "institutional interest in policing the
margins of [subject matter] jurisdiction
is of greater concern than any
53
perceived inequity that may exist."
Jurisdiction, therefore, is independent of the merits; its boundaries
should be strictly enforced. Unless these declarations are empty rhetoric,
a correlation between reversals of subject matter jurisdiction and
judicial efforts spent at the trial court on the merits can suggest that
judges are overly influenced by past judicial input. This is the hypothesis
of this research.
B.

The Database

Given the hypothesis (jurisdiction is independent of the merits, and
its boundaries should be strictly enforced), this Article looks for an
empirical correlation between reversals of jurisdictional questions and
judicial efforts at the trial level on the merits. Therefore, the data consists
of appellate cases in which the trial court upheld its jurisdiction,
proceeded to the merits (with or without a trial), and the jurisdiction
dispute was challenged again at the appellate court. The dependent
variable is the likelihood of reversing the trial court's jurisdiction. 4 The
independent variable indicates judicial efforts spent at the trial level on
the merits. 5
limited jurisdiction. Consequently, such courts must monitor their jurisdictional
boundaries vigilantly.
Id. at 62 n.5 (citing Am. Fiber & Finishing, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP, 362 F.3d 136, 139,
142-43 (1st Cir. 2004)); see also supra note 45. Another example is Del Vecchio v. Conseco, Inc.,
where the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals voided a summary judgment entered by the trial court,
admitting that:
While we are not unsympathetic to the waste of effort represented by a case that has been
fully litigated in the wrong court, both the Supreme Court and we ourselves have noted
time and again that subject matter jurisdiction is a fundamental limitation on the power
of a federal court to act. Once it appears, as it has here, that subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking, only one path lies open to us. We hereby [vacate] the [trial court's summary
judgment].
230 F.3d 974, 980 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also Shaffer v. GTE North, Inc., 284 F.3d
500, 504-05 (3d Cir. 2002) (vacating the settlement agreement at issue, as the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, and asserting that "this reconfirmation of basic jurisdictional
principles ... will [hopefully] avoid any further repetition in other cases of the painful lesson taught
here.").
53. Am. Fiber& Finishing,Inc., 362 F.3d at 142-43.
54. The "dependent variable" is a variable that represents the phenomenon that the theory
attempts to explain. See ANOL BHATrACHERJEE, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH: PRINCIPLES,
METHODS, AND PRACTICES 12 (2d ed. 2012). In this context, the dependent variable is whether or
not the appellate court reverses the trial court's jurisdiction. I expect to observe more reversals
where more judicial efforts were spent on the merits.
55. The "independent variable" is a variable that explains changes in the dependent variable.
Id.In this context, the independent variable is the amount of judicial efforts at the trial level on the
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This Article relies on the procedural posture in which the original
case ended as a proxy for previous judicial efforts. Specifically, the
independent variable indicates whether the district court decides the
merits by a bench or jury trial, or before trial-through a motion to
dismiss, or a motion for summary judgment, for example.
The procedural posture in which the trial court disposed of the case
plausibly indicates judicial efforts on the merits. Generally, the later the
procedural stage, the more the district judge invests in a case. 6 In
particular, cases that ended with jury or bench trials ordinarily implicate
larger judicial resources than cases that ended with summary judgments
or motions to dismiss. 7 More importantly, a later procedural posture
does not mean that the district judge made a correct jurisdictional
determination. Jurisdictional questions are adjudicated at the outset, and
are not affected by a subsequent disposition of the merits. The fact that
the case proceeded to a bench or jury trial on the merits should not, in
itself, make the preliminary 59jurisdiction decision correct when the
appellate court later reviews it.
The database consists of courts of appeals' decisions in which there
is a genuine challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. I
collected the data through an online legal research database. In order to
keep only non-frivolous jurisdictional challenges, the dataset includes

merits, and I expect this variable to be correlated with fewer reversals.
56. See, e.g., RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 403-05,442-44 (2d ed. 2009).
57. See generally Craig M. Reiser, The UnconstitutionalApplication of Summary Judgment in
Factually Intensive Inquiries, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 195 (2009) (arguing that although summary
judgment motions help preserve further use of judicial resources that would be necessary for trial,
there is an underlying constitutional issue under the Seventh Amendment).
58. See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction,Merits, and Substantiality, 42 TULSA L.
REV. 579, 591 (2007).
59. In early versions of this research, I experimented with two other variables for judicial
efforts and tested the results on a small subsample. The first variable was the length (pages) of the
decision (or decisions) rendered by the district court; the second was the time (months) during
which the case was pending at the trial court. The length of the trial court opinion had virtually no
effect on reversal rates of jurisdictional questions. This outcome might be due to measurement
distortions, as the court often issues several decisions, not all of them reported. The time during
which the case was pending at the trial court had a mixed effect-cases that ended within one year
did have the highest reversal rate ofjurisdictional questions, as expected, but cases that ended in the
second year had a lower reversal rate than cases that ended after more than three years. This effect,
though far from being statistically significant, may indicate that the time the case is pending is an
unreliable measure for judicial efforts, as some cases are latently pending for a long time.
Be that as it may, the use of opinion-pages and months also entails conceptual difficulties,
as one cannot know whether these judicial efforts-indicated by the time the case was pending and
the length of the decision-are truly independent of the jurisdictional issue. In contrast, judicial
work during trial on the merits is by definition irrelevant to the preliminary jurisdiction
determination. For this reason, I focused on the procedural posture in which the case ended to
indicate past judicial efforts on the merits.
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appellate cases in which the exact phrase "subject matter jurisdiction"
appears in one of the following: synopsis; digest; topic; notes; or
60
summary of the opinion. I reviewed the cases manually to keep only
the cases in which the appellate court indeed examined the trial court's
decision to retain jurisdiction. The resulting database encompasses
all of the decisions of the last decade in six different circuit courts, in
which a genuine challenge to the trial court's jurisdiction arose-overall,
375 decisions. 6'

IV.
A.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The Variablesand Descriptive Statistics

The dependent variable is JURISDICTION-whether the circuit court
affirmed, reversed, or remanded the jurisdictional question. In the
majority of the cases (approximately 63%), the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's jurisdiction.62 Note that this variable solely describes
how the appellate court handled the jurisdictional question, as it might
affirm jurisdiction, but reverse the merits. Usually, however, the
resolution of the jurisdictional question comports with the decision on
the merits. 63
The independent variable is the procedural posture in which the
district court, upon affirming jurisdiction, disposed of the case, and, in
particular, whether a complete jury or bench TRIAL was held. The
majority of cases (approximately 85%) ended before a full trial (e.g.,
upon a summary judgment motion). I expect appellate judges to reverse
on jurisdictional grounds more often where there was no trial on the
merits at the district court.

60. Technically, the search command on Westlaw was: sy("subject matter jurisdiction")
no("subject matter jurisdiction") di("subject matter jurisdiction") to("subject matter jurisdiction")
su("subject matter jurisdiction").
61. Cases ended between January 2000 and October 2009 in the First, Second, Third, Seventh,
Eighth, and the D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals. These six circuits were chosen because they diverge
on a number of characteristics such as: number of districts per circuit; average distance between the
circuit and district headquarters; geographical location; and workload.
62. Cases in which the appellate court remanded the jurisdiction question comprise
approximately 5% of the database. I conjectured that appellate judges' tendency to affirm stems
from concerns about rendering prior judicial efforts useless. See supra Part 11.Hence, remands are
closer to affirmations: the appellate court actually enables the trial court to correct its mistakes and
avoid a loss of judicial efforts by finding an alternative ground for jurisdiction. Thus, unless
otherwise stated, remands are treated as affirmations. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
63. To illustrate, when the appellate court affirms the trial court's jurisdiction, the odds of
reversing the case (on the merits) are only approximately 10%.
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The regression includes a host of control variables. 64 These are the
most important ones:
INTERLOCUTORY
APPEALS-the
"final
judgment
rule"
notwithstanding, there are some exceptions in which litigants can bring
interlocutory appeals amidst a trial (e.g., preliminary injunctions). 65 Most
of the cases in the sample represent appeals from final orders
66
(approximately 88%). Interlocutory appeals avoid prolonged litigation.
Therefore, I expect appellate judges to reverse jurisdiction more often in
interlocutory appeals.
The regression also controls for the TYPE of the case. The majority
of the cases in the database (approximately 54%) are civil cases. Other
categories are public law (administrative and constitutional cases), civil
rights, criminal, and post-criminal (e.g., habeas corpus) cases.
For each case, there is information about the CIRCUIT that decides
the case and the DISTRICT from which the case originated. As mentioned
above, the database includes cases from six different circuit courts over
the last decade.67 In order to account for doctrinal trends, the
regression also controls for the YEAR in which the appellate court
rendered the decision.
The database contains information regarding the district court's
DISTANCE from the circuit court. As mentioned, judges might be
reluctant to reverse their fellow judges who invested considerable efforts
in the case; the closer the judges, the less likely reversals are to occur. In
order to grasp-albeit roughly-the proximity between circuit and
district judges, I recorded the distance between the circuit and district
headquarters. The farthest district is Puerto Rico-which is part of the
First Circuit-and located 1671 miles from Boston. 68 The closest
districts are those that are located at the circuit headquarters (e.g., the
Southern District of New York).

64. Regression analysis is a common statistical technique for modeling and analyzing the
relationship between the dependent variable (here, the likelihood of reversing jurisdiction) and the
independent variable (whether there was a trial), controlling for other explanatory variables.
65. See, e.g., John C. Nagel, Note, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals in
Jurisprudencewith Discretionary Review, 44 DUKE L.J. 200, 203 (1994) (discussing interlocutory
appeals as an exception to the final judgment rule).
66. See Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88
HARV. L. REV. 607, 610-12 (1975) (discussing the background of interlocutory appeals and their
intended purpose of promoting judicial efficiency).
67. See supranote 61.
68.

Compare

Court

Location,

U.S.

COURT

APPEALS

FIRST

CIRCUIT,

http://www.cal.uscourts.gov (last visited Feb. 15, 2015), with Puerto Rico District Court, JUSTIA,
https://www.justia.com/us-states/puerto-rico/courts/district-court/main-office.html (last visited Feb.

15,2015).
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for approximately 7% of the database.
Class litigation is a proxy for a more complicated case, which requires
larger judicial resources at the trial court. Hence, I expect appellate
69
judges to reverse jurisdiction less frequently in class action lawsuits.
CLASS ACTIONS account

B. CorrelatingJudicialEfforts with Reversal Rates
The results reveal the negative correlation between district judges'
efforts on the merits and appellate courts' tendency to reverse the trial
court's jurisdiction. Table 1, below, demonstrates this phenomenon. In
cases that ended before a full trial, there is an approximately 36% chance
of reversing the trial court's jurisdiction. In cases that ended after a jury
or bench trial, the corresponding figure is only approximately 16%:
Table 1: Reversal Rates v. Trial
Decisions
Decisions
After Trial
Without Trial
Jurisdiction
Reversed

35.7%

15.8%

Jurisdiction

64.3%

84.2%

100%

100%

Affirmed

Total

A regression analysis,70 that takes into account the control variables,
shows that this effect of trials at the district court-which is associated
with a sharp difference in the likelihood of reversing the jurisdiction
question-is also statistically significant. 7'
72
Other noteworthy patterns emerge from the regression:
interlocutory appeals are correlated with more reversals of the district

69. The same logic applies to consolidated cases (approximately 23% of the dataset). Other
variables are APPELLANT (recognizing that, in approximately 64% of the cases, the original
defendant appeals), and UNANIMOUS (noting that, in approximately 92% of the cases, there is no
dissent or concurring opinion).
70. Unless otherwise stated, the regression analysis that this Subpart refers to is Regression
(1). See infra Table A. 1.
71. "Significance" in statistics means that the odds that a certain result was created by chance
are below a certain low threshold (commonly, 1%, 5%, or 10%). Here, the correlation between trials
and reversals ofjurisdiction is statistically significant at the 5% level. See infra Part VIII app.
72. The relevant regression, Regression (I), treats bench and jury trials alike. One may think,
however, that appellate judges respond differently to bench and jury trials, affirming jurisdiction to a
different extent in each case. Several regressions in the appendix accordingly break the variable
TRIAL to bench and jury trials, with mixed results. See infra Tables A. 1-.2.
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court's jurisdiction. 73 This fits initial expectations, as interlocutory
appeals involve less judicial efforts at the trial court.7 4
Class litigation is correlated with affirming the trial court's
jurisdiction,75 as expected. Complex litigation is more likely to involve
heavy judicial investments at the district court on the merits, and thus,
the court of appeals is more likely to affirm the trial court's jurisdiction.
The type of case matters. In particular, jurisdictional questions in
criminal cases stand out as the least likely to be reversed. 76 This might
suggest that questions of jurisdiction in criminal cases are less
complicated, hence trial courts are less likely to err. This correlation
might also suggest that the observed phenomenon is driven by distinct
motives. Criminal cases are visible. Public opinion, it seems, would find
a reversal of criminal conviction for mere jurisdictional flaws
particularly troublesome.77 Therefore, the pattern observed in criminal
cases might be motivated by the desire to gain public confidence through
a facade of consistency. 78
The district circuit distance is correlated with more reversals of the
trial court's jurisdiction, as expected. The further away the district court
is, the more likely the appellate court is to reverse jurisdiction. This
effect is, however, small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. This
point should be clarified, then, by further research.
To sum up, the findings reveal a non-trivial and statistically
significant correlation between having a trial at the district court and
affirming the lower court's jurisdiction. To demonstrate the magnitude
of this phenomenon, all else being equal, take the following hypothetical
examples with and without a trial at the district court:

73. This effect, other things being equal, is statistically significant at the 10% level. It is also
substantial in magnitude.
74. See Edward H. Cooper, Timing as Jurisdiction: Federal Civil Appeals in Context, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 157, 160.

75. This effect, other things being equal, is statistically significant at the 10% level and also
substantial in magnitude.
76. Not only is this effect statistically significant at the 5% level, it is also very strong in
magnitude.
77. Moreover, criminal cases typically implicate additional substantial investment of
resources, by grand juries that decide whether or not to indict. Hence, one may expect appellate
judges to be all the more reluctant to waste these efforts through reversals.
78. Compare the reversal rate of criminal to post-criminal cases (e.g., habeas corpus). In the
latter, where the defendant is usually the government, the court of appeals is by far more likely to

reverse the district court's jurisdiction.
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Table 2: Numerical Illustrations 79
Affirming
Affirming
JurisdictionGiven
JurisdictionGiven
No Trial
Trial

Civil Case: 2d Circuit

79.5%

90.3%

Civil Case: 7th Circuit

65.8%

82.2%

Criminal Case: 8th
Circuit
Public Law Case: D.C.
Circuit
Human Rights Case: 1st
Circuit

958%

98.2%

75.6%
68.6%

88.2%
84.0%

Though they are only conservative estimates,80 these figures show

the non-trivial effect-a trial can make a difference of almost up to
twenty percentage points. Thus, many denied appeals should have

been accepted.
C.

Robustness Checks

I conducted several additional checks to buttress the findings.
1. Remands

In addition to affirming and reversing, the appellate court can
remand the question of jurisdiction to the district court for
reconsideration. 8' Remands allow the court of appeals to potentially save

judicial resources from vanishing. Up to this point, remands have been
treated as affirmations. But what happens when a closer look is taken?
When remands are excluded, the results are similar, though some

statistical significance is lost.82 However, when remands are compared to
affirmations, an opposite, and more interesting, picture appears. Other
things being equal, appellate courts are much more likely to remand a
jurisdictional question when there was a bench or jury trial at the district
court,83 and this correlation is statistically significant.84
79. In all of these simulations, except the D.C. Circuit simulation, the defendant appeals and
the distance is the median distance. In the D.C. Circuit example, the district and circuit courts are
located at the same place.
80. These numbers are based on the results of Regression (1) in the appendix. See infra Part
VIII app. This is the most conservative regression. All other regressions show a higher, and
sometimes much higher, influence. See infra Tables A. 1-.2.
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006).
82. The correlation between having a trial at the district court and affirming jurisdiction
becomes significant at the 10% level, rather than the 5% level. See infra Table B.
83. Cf Gao, supra note 30, at 2379 (discussing the proposition that courts should sustain
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The observed phenomenon, then, has dual influence. Not only do
courts of appeals prefer affirming jurisdiction to reversing it when the
trial court spent precious judicial resources; they also tend to use more
remands in these circumstances.
2. Federal Question Cases
Federal courts can obtain jurisdiction when the plaintiff alleges a
violation of the U.S. Constitution or of a federal statute. 85 These are
federal question cases. Alternatively, federal courts can acquire
jurisdiction because the parties are "diverse" in citizenship, i.e.,
they are residents of different states or non-U.S. citizens.8 6 This is
diversity jurisdiction.
One can argue that this study should focus on federal question
jurisdiction, and exclude diversity cases. Determining diversity may
require some factual inquiry. 87 Furthermore, diversity is a fluid feature; it
can be "created" and "destroyed, ' 88 sometimes by the litigants
themselves. 89 Thus, it makes sense to reiterate the regressions with only
federal question cases.
When including only federal question cases, the results are all the
more robust. Given no trial at the district court, the odds of reversing the
district court's jurisdiction are approximately 36%; with a bench or jury
trial, these odds are only approximately 13%. This difference is
statistically significant. 90
3. Non-Similar Cases
Appeals might not be representative of the universe of caseslitigants choose to appeal, and this selection process might bias the
results. In particular, litigants may appeal more aggressively after full
trials. To account for this, I ran several other regressions.

jurisdiction when it actually exists but was not properly pled).
84. The correlation is statistically significant at the 5% level. See infra Table B.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012).
87. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE I, supra note 41, at 259-60; Gao, supra note
30, at 2379-80.
88.

See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 1, supra note 41, at 262-63; Gao, supra note

30, at 2382-85 (showing a variety of examples where diversity can be created or destroyed).
89. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE I, supra note 41, at 262-63; cf Caterpillar

Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 64-66 (1996) (finding that the litigants were able to create diversity).
What matters doctrinally, however, is the time of filing. See Gao, supra note 30, at 2380-81.
90. The results are statistically significant at the 5% level. See infra Table A.2. The federal
question sample includes 140 cases of the original 375 cases-I included in the new sample only
cases in which the phrase "federal question" or "federal subject-matter jurisdiction" appears.
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a. Excluding Frivolous Challenges to Jurisdiction
One might argue that the underlying jurisdictional questions are
different across cases, as cases that ended in a full trial are more likely to
be appealed, and frivolous challenges to jurisdiction are more likely in
this group. The research already accounts-to some extent-for this
concern, as the database consists of decisions in which the phrase
"subject matter jurisdiction" appears only in the synopsis, digest, topic,
notes, or summary. However, "notes" or "topic" may be very broad. To
further mitigate these concerns, and exclude frivolous jurisdictional
challenges, I ran the regressions on a subsample of cases in which the
phrase "subject matter jurisdiction" appears only in the summary or the
synopsis of the decision.9 1
The results are telling: while the reversal rate of jurisdictional
questions for non-trial decisions is approximately 39%, a trial decreases
this figure to approximately 8%. Not only is this effect large in
magnitude, it is also highly statistically significant.92 This suggests that,
93
if anything, the selection process mitigates the observed phenomenon.
Focusing on serious, genuine questions of jurisdiction, the observed
phenomenon is much stronger.
b. Controlling for the Merits
Cases in the database vary in the strength of their substantive
merits. To account for this problem, additional regressions
were conducted.
First, summary order cases were excluded. A summary order is a
decision without any reasoning or precedential value.94 Hence, these
summary
cases are more likely to represent unmeritorious appeals. When
95
orders are excluded, the results are-again-very similar.
Second, the monetary value of a case can indicate its importance.
Unfortunately, the monetary value is usually not apparent from the
appellate court decision. In a small subsample, though, the decision

91. The subsample included 139 cases overall.
92. The effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. See infra Table A.2.
93. One explanation is that weaker, non-trial cases are more likely to raise frivolous
challenges to jurisdiction.
94. See, e.g., Anne Coyle, Note, A Modest Reform: The New Rule 32.1 Permitting Citation to
Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471, 2491 (2004)

(describing summary orders and stating that they are often given orally from the bench).
95. Given no trial, the probability of reversing jurisdiction is approximately 37%. Where a
trial was held, however, the odds are much smaller-approximately 15%. This effect is statistically
significant at the 5% level. See infra Table A.2.
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indicates the monetary value.96 Within this sample, monetary value has a
meager and insignificant effect on reversal rates of jurisdictional
questions and the phenomenon that this Article describes. 97
These checks lend further support to the proposition that appellate
judges are increasingly reluctant to reverse jurisdiction where the trial
judge invested more efforts on the merits of the case. This effect
increases the odds of both affirming and remanding jurisdiction, and the
results are even more robust when a smaller sample of federal question
cases is considered. The exclusion of frivolous and non-meritorious
jurisdictional challenges and appeals enhances the observed
phenomenon, and it seems that the monetary value of a case
does not influence the basic findings. To the extent the results can be
generalized to settings other than jurisdictional questions, one has to
think of the implications.
V.

NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS

The results indicate that appellate judges are influenced by
seemingly irrelevant efforts spent by trial judges.98 This phenomenon
invites modifications in the existing rules of procedure.
One direction for reform is related to standards of review. If
appellate judges are less likely to reverse where trial judges made
considerable efforts, a more aggressive standard of review of previous
decisions should compensate for the tendency to stick to a prior course
of action. Moreover, the standard of review should be tailored to the
efforts previously invested. In the context of appellate decision-making,
this logic leads to a more searching review of final judgments (as
opposed to interlocutory appeals), and questions that are decided
at the beginning of litigation and are followed by considerable
judicial efforts on other issues (typically legal questions, as opposed to
factual questions). 99
96. Sometimes, the appellate decision indicates the monetary award at the trial level. When
only the amount the plaintiff demanded was indicated, I recorded half of this figure as the monetary
value (under the rough assumption that plaintiffs win 50% of the time).
97. As an unreported regression shows, controlling for the monetary value leaves the
magnitude of the correlation between trial at the district court and reversing jurisdiction intact.
However, this finding should be interpreted with caution, as the number of decisions in this
subsample is small (79 cases) and the results are statistically insignificant. Nonetheless, the
correlations are illustrative. All else equal, monetary value and affirmations of jurisdiction are
negatively correlated, suggesting that, if anything, jurisdictional determinations in more important
cases are more likely to be reversed. However, the correlation between trial at the district court and
affirming jurisdiction remains positive.
98. See supra Part IV.B-C.
99. Interestingly, this distinction fits current doctrine. Questions of law are reviewed under a
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The same logic applies to other contexts in which one judge
evaluates prior decisions made by another decision-maker. Given
judges' tendency not to deviate from a prior course of action, then,
courts might benefit from a more demanding review of administrative
and arbitration judgments, and a greater attention to habeas corpus and
new trial petitions.
To the extent that the empirical findings can be further generalized,
and individual judges are not likely to deviate from their own prior
decisions, °° the findings strengthen the argument for bifurcating
decision-making. In several areas of law, there is an ongoing debate
regarding whether or not to split decision-making between two different
judges. One notable example is remanding a case to the same trial judge
for further proceedings;0 1 another is the ability of class action judges,
who were heavily involved in settlement negotiations, to assess,
impartially, the fairness of a settlement. 0 2 As bifurcated decisionmaking can reduce-though not eliminate-the attachment to a prior
course of action, 0 3 the findings suggest that a greater propensity to
bifurcate improves decision-making in these areas.
These procedural modifications notwithstanding, the major reform
that this Article proposes is a broader right to interlocutory appeals.
Thus, interlocutory appeals are an effective tool to improve appellate
decision-making.
A.

The FinalJudgment Rule

If appellate judges are affected by the trial court's efforts, even
where these efforts are irrelevant, one should attempt to insulate
appellate judges from data concerning the trial court's decision. 10 4 This
broad de novo review. See generally 9C CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2588 (3d ed. 2008). Questions of fact, however, are reviewed under a
narrow "clearly erroneous" standard. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
100. For a discussion on cognitive biases in this respect, see supra notes 20-24 and
accompanying text.
101. The current test for reassigning to a different judge upon remand is very narrow. Absent
"unusual circumstances," courts of appeals tend not to reassign a case to a different judge. See, e.g.,
United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 785 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1986); see also RICHARD E.
FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 1006-09 (2d

ed. 2007) (surveying the different standards that different circuit courts apply).
102. See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371,
426-27 (2001); cf Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudging, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 424-31 (1982). By
and large, judges cannot be disqualified for structuring settlements. See FLAMM, supra note 101, at
335-41.

103.

See supranote 24.

104.

Cf Adrian Vermeule, Veil of IgnoranceRules in ConstitutionalLaw, Ill YALE. L.J. 399,

403-05 (2001) (praising some sort of ignorance in decision-making).
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"veil of ignorance" is not a practical solution. Instead, one should aim at
avoiding the very situations in which appellate judges review interim
decisions after the case has already been decided on the merits. The
implications are clear-a broader right to interlocutory appeals should
result in more accurate appellate decision-making.
Legal systems have different views on interlocutory appeals. Some
states-most notably, New York' 05-are known for their broad right to
interlocutory appeals. The federal system, however, is notorious for
its strict adherence to the "final judgment rule:" 10 6 appeals can
only be taken from "final decisions of the district courts of the United
States.'0 7 What are the policy considerations behind the federal final
judgment rule?
Emanating from early English tradition,'0 8 the final judgment rule
has obvious policy advantages; "The basic rationale of the finality rule is
conservation of judicial resources."' 0 9 The benefits of the final judgment
rule include: enabling a speedy and smooth trial;110 reducing the number
of appeals in each case;"' allowing the appellate court a more
comprehensive review of the merits; 112 avoiding tactical delays and
3 and, allegedly,
harassment through frequent petitions for review;"
4
1
judge.
trial
the
of
better respect for the authority
105. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5701(a)(2) (McKinney 1995) ("An appeal may be taken to the
appellate division as of ight... [including from orders that] involve[] some part of the merits; or
affect[] a substantial right ....). Other notable states that share a similar procedural policy include
Wisconsin, Arizona, California, and New Jersey. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE 620 & n.18, 621 & n.22 (4th ed. 2005) [hereinafter FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE Il].
106. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE II, supra note 105, at 622 ("Without doubt, the

").
federal courts are among the most strict in adhering to the finality requirement ....
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). A final judgment is a decision that "ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324
U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
108. See Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right
Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 717, 727 (1993); Nagel, supra note 65, at 202.
109. Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L. REV. 351, 351-52 (1961)
[hereinafter Note, Appealability]; see also Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding
to Decide: Class Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of
Appeals Under Rule 2369, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 1547-48 (2000).
110. DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962) ("This insistence on finality and
prohibition of piecemeal review discourage undue litigiousness and leaden-footed administration of
");
see also Note, Appealability, supra note 109, at 351-52.
justice ....
111. See Note, Appealability, supra note 109, at 352. Potential interim appeals will eventually
be consolidated into a single, final appeal. See id.In addition, parties may settle before trial or
completely forgo their right to appeal. Cf Nagel, supra note 65, at 203.
112. See Note, Appealability,supranote 109, at 352.
113. Id.at 351; see Cooper, supra note 74, at 158; Nagel, supra note 65, at 203; see also
Solimine & Hines, supranote 109, at 1547-48.
114. See Nagel, supra note 65, at 203; cf Note, Appealability,supra note 109, at 352.
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The literature has also noted the parallel counter-arguments.
115
Interlocutory appeals can avoid costly and redundant proceedings;

correct situations in which final judgments have no practical

importance;" 6 and produce essential guidance to lower courts where
interim orders are not likely to be reviewed within final appeals (e.g.,
7
discovery rules). 1
Every legal system strikes a balance between these competing
considerations, on a continuum between a complete final judgment rule
and a full right of interlocutory review. It has been noted that "[t]he
difference between the two approaches to appealability ...is not as

much philosophical as it is a difference in the method in which a
particular jurisdiction has decided to balance [the conflicting
interests] .... 1 Even the apparently strict federal final judgment rule

is not intact, as "the courts and Congress have created a patchwork of
exceptions" to it. 119 Moreover, "[t]he final judgment requirement has

been supplemented by a list of elaborations, expansions, evasions, and
outright exceptions that is dazzling in its complexity."'' 20 Indeed, much
ink has been spilled in an attempt to decipher or suggest the exact
12 1
boundaries of the federal final judgment rule.

115. See Cooper, supra note 74, at 160; Note, Appealability,supra note 109, at 352.
116. See Cooper, supra note 74, at 157, 162; Note, Appealability, supra note 109, at 352-53;
see also Nagel, supranote 65, at 203.
117. Cooper, supra note 74, at 158, 162 ("Loss of the need for review ... may carry a cost that
goes beyond the demands of the particular case, as appellate courts may be deprived of the
opportunity to clarify and improve the law on matters that repeatedly evade review."); see also
Note, Appealability, supranote 109, at 352.
118. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE II, supra note 105, at 621-22; see also Nagel,
supra note 65, at 203-04 ("The battle between these competing concerns expiains why the Supreme
Court... for many years failed to apply the final judgment rule rigidly, eschewing a clear definition
of 'final judgment."' (footnotes omitted)).
119. Nagel, supra note 65, at 200. Notable areas in which there is available interlocutory
review are: concluding orders in cases of multiple parties, FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); injunctions, 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2006); notice requirement in class actions, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156, 169-72 (1974); posting of security for costs, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949); and appointment of receiverships, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2) (2006).
120. Cooper, supra note 74, at 157; see also Note, Appealability,supra note 109, at 352, 357.
121. See, e.g., Martineau, supranote 108, at 749-54 (suggesting to move toward a discretionary
appeal system); Nagel, supra note 65, 204-09 (same); Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for NonDiscretionaryInterlocutory Appellate Review in Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
1643, 1685-93 (2011) (arguing for interlocutory review in multidistrict litigation); Michael E.
Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1165,
1168, 1178-79 (1990) (advocating for "less judicial hostility toward interlocutory appeals"); Leah
Epstein, Comment, A Balanced Approach to Mandamus Review of Attorney Disqualification
Orders, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 667, 673, 675-78 (2005) (discussing interlocutory appeals from attorney
disqualification decisions); Nathan A. Forrester, Comment, Mandamus as a Remedy for the Denial
of Jury Trial, 58 U. CI. L. REV. 769, 775-80 (1991) (discussing interlocutory appeals from
decisions to deny a jury trial); Gayle Gerson, Note, A Return to Practicality:Reforming the Fourth
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This large body of literature neglects one important issue-how the
final judgment rule affects appellate judges' decision-making. This
Article attempts to fill the gap. As it shows, the final judgment rule,
which accumulates judicial resources at the trial court level, is correlated
with fewer reversals. 122 Had interlocutory appeals been available, some
meritorious appeals, currently unsuccessful, would have likely been
accepted. 123 As long as accurate appellate decision-making is an
important value, 124 the phenomenon that this Article describes tilts the
current balance between the final judgment rule and interlocutory
appeals in the latter direction.
To be more specific, this logic can highlight certain enclaves where
the risk of inaccurate appellate decision-making is greater, and thus,
interlocutory appeals are presumably more desirable. This class of cases
includes lower court decisions that, if wrong, would entail a huge waste
of judicial resources. 125 One obvious candidate is lower courts' decisions
to uphold their subject matter jurisdiction. This logic is also pertinent to
other contexts. In fact, every denial of a preliminary challenge that can
serve as a ground for dismissal fits this pattern. Notable examples are
personal jurisdiction, affirmative defenses (e.g., statute of limitations, res
judicata), other prudential restrictions26on jurisdiction (e.g., forum non
conveniens), and recusal applications.1
Given that the relevant factor is the amount of judicial effort spent
in case the interim decision is mistaken, rights to interlocutory appeals
should sometimes be asymmetric.

Cox Exception to the Final Judgment Rule Governing Supreme Court CertiorariReview of State
Court Judgments, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 789, 800 (2004) (discussing interlocutory review by the
Supreme Court from constitutional judgments decided in state courts); see also Niehaus v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 173 F.3d 1207, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1999) (expanding interlocutory review of
decisions to remand cases to state courts).
122. See supraPart IV.B.
123. See supra Part I.B.
124. For the utility of more accurate decision-making, see Louis Kaplow, The Value of
Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 396-97 (1994).
125. Cf Cooper, supra note 74, at 162-63 ("The substantive impact of possible error may seem
so clear as to warrant a routine right of interlocutory appeal .... "); Pollis, supra note 121, at 1643
(asserting that interlocutory review in multidistrict litigation is important, as a single "error can
have.., sweeping impact on thousands of cases").
126. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)-(6) (identifying various defenses that a party may bring
in response to the plaintiffs complaint at an early stage of the litigation, including lack of personal
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CiVIL PROCEDURE I, supra note 41,
at 338-42 (discussing attacks on district court decisions on subject matter jurisdiction);
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE II, supra note 105, at 622 (discussing how the preliminary

decision of a trial court in rejecting to hear a personal jurisdiction objection is interlocutory, and
cannot be heard until a final judgment is rendered on the merits).
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127
1. Interlocutory Review from Class Certification Decisions
The case for interlocutory review of decisions to certify (or refuse
to certify) class actions is illuminating. Certification decisions should be
made at the beginning of litigation. 2 8 Certification is crucial, as the
stakes are often too small to justify individual litigation.12 9 A falsenegative-i.e., an erroneous order denying class certification-serves,
therefore, as "the 'death knell' of the litigation."' 130 Similarly, falsepositives constitue "the inverse-death-knell doctrine," because "if [the
certification] order were erroneous, and therefore reversed on appeal, the
action would for all practical purposes be at an end.' 13 1 Based on these
doctrines, 132 several courts of appeals decided that certification orders
are "final judgments," allowing interlocutory appeals accordingly. 133 The
Supreme Court, however, rejected this view. 134 Congress responded,
authorizing the advisory committee to reconsider this subject. 135 The
adoption of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) ("Rule 23(f)")
followed in 1998.136 Rule 23(f) allows a broader right to interlocutory
appeals from certification decisions. 37 It gives "[t]he court of
appeals ...unfettered discretion whether to permit the appeal, akin to
the discretion exercised by the Supreme Court in acting on a petition for

127. Class actions are not automatically available, as the court has to certify a lawsuit as a class
action. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c). Hence, after filing a complaint, the plaintiff should move to have
the class certified.
128. FED. R. CIv, P. 23(c)(1)(A) ("At an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as
a class representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a class
action.").
129. Janet Cooper Alexander, An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the United States
5-6 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
130. Solimine & Hines, supra note 109, at 1553.
131. Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094, 1098-99 (2d Cir. 1974); FRIEDENTHAL
ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE II, supra note 105, at 625. Furthermore, erroneous grants of class
certifications "may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action
and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability." FED. R. CIv. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note.
132. The death knell doctrine is defined as "[a] rule allowing an interlocutory appeal if
precluding an appeal until final judgment would moot the issue on appeal and irreparably injure the
appellant's rights." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 459 (9th ed. 2009).
133. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE II, supra note 105, at 621, 625.
134. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467-68, 475-77 (1978) (holding that an
order denying class certification does not qualify as a final judgment, and therefore, the "death
knell" doctrine does not support appellate jurisdiction).
135.

1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED

AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, at vii (1997) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rales/WorkingPapers-Voll .pdf.
136. Christopher A. Kitchen, Note, Interlocutory Appeals of Class Action Certification
Decisions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 230f: A Proposalfor a New Guideline, 2004
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 231, 242.

137. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(t).
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138

Providing this wide discretion, Rule 23(f) guides courts of

appeals to "develop standards for granting review."'1 39 Courts and
academics alike have been struggling to develop these standards. 140 This
Article adds a new perspective to this endeavor.
To be sure, the desire to allow a broader right to interlocutory
appeals from class certification orders was not driven by the fear of
erroneous appellate decision-making; rather, it endorses the so-called
death knell rationales. 141 Nevertheless, the logic of this Article can be
helpful to clarify the appropriate standards for granting interlocutory
review from class certification orders.
The advisory committee is agnostic between grants and refusals of
class certification, 142 but the findings of this study are not. A decision
refusing to certify a class is, defacto, equal to terminating the case, with
only little additional investment of judicial efforts.143 However, an order
granting class certification can be followed by adjudication, entailing the
risk of heavy investment of irreparable judicial efforts that are required
to resolve the claims of the entire class. Hence, an order granting
certification represents a more appropriate case for interlocutory review.
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834-35 (7th Cir. 1999)
(considering several factors including: whether a denial of certification is likely to end litigation; to
what extent the defendant is pressed to settle; and the legal importance of the rule); Carey M.
Erhard, A Discussion of the Interlocutory Review of Class Certification Orders Under FederalRule
of Civil Procedure 2369, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 151, 171-74 (2002) (summarizing case law and
recommending more uniformity across circuits); Charles R. Flores, Appealing Class Action
CertificationDecisions Under FederalRule of Civil Procedure23(o, 4 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV.
27, 41-44 (2007) (surveying case law and urging appellate courts to better explain their reasoning
behind granting or denying interlocutory appeals); Solimine & Hines, supra note 109, at 1577
(advocating several relevant factors, such as: "[T]he presence of a death knell or a reverse death
knell; the likelihood of reversal; the presence of intraclass conflicts; and the existence of
simultaneous, related litigation in other courts"); Kitchen, supra note 136, at 233 (suggesting that
"courts of appeals should... allow[] for appeal when ... the district court's decision is 'likely
erroneous'); Aimee G. Mackay, Comment, Appealability of Class Certification Orders Under
FederalRule of Civil Procedure23W6: Toward a PrincipledApproach, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 755, 809
(2002) (stressing that "courts should accept review in cases involving important questions... [such
as] certification orders that present truly novel issues").
141.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note ("Permission is most likely to be granted
when ... as a practical matter, the decision on certification is likely dispositive of the litigation.").
142. Id. Rule 23(f) states:
An order denying certification may confront the plaintiff with a situation in which the
only sure path to appellate review is by proceeding to final judgment on the merits of an
individual claim that, standing alone, is far smaller than the costs of litigation. An order
granting certification, on the other hand, may force a defendant to settle rather than incur
the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.
Id.
143. See Alexander, supra note 129, at 6. Even if the case is not finished, the court will only
invest the resources required to solve the plaintiff's personal claims.
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In other words, the court of appeals is more likely to deny meritorious
challenges to class certification orders where certification was granted
(and then followed by costly proceedings). In this sense, the inversedeath-knell theory is a stronger argument than the death knell theory. 44
Therefore, and subject to the idiosyncrasies of each case, this study
advocates an asymmetric right to interlocutory appeals from class
certification orders.
2. Asymmetric Interlocutory Appeals-Arbitration Proceedings
While the drafters of Rule 23(f) did not craft an asymmetric right to
interlocutory review, asymmetric interlocutory appeals do exist in the
Federal Arbitration Act. 145 Section 16(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act
provides that an appeal may be taken from an order denying
a petition to compel arbitration. However, in a mirror-image
case-an order compelling
arbitration-there is no similar right to
46
interlocutory review. 1
This asymmetric interlocutory appeal does not seem to be driven by
the desire to improve appellate decision-making; 147 rather, it appears to
be part of a broad pro-arbitration policy. 148 Whether the drafters had in
mind appellate decision-making or not, § 16 embraces the logic of this
Article. Where a trial court's erroneous order is likely to trigger
redundant proceedings in federal courts-and hence, a greater risk of
biased appellate decision-making-interlocutory appeals are more
valuable. When the trial court's mistake does not entail additional
federal proceedings, there is less risk of error in appellate decisionmaking, and interlocutory appeals are not as important. Hence, from the
perspective of this Article, the case for interlocutory appeals from orders
denying arbitration is stronger. This approach can be extended to other
144. Interestingly, and contrary to this logic, courts of appeals used to be less receptive to the
inverse-death-knell theory. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE II, supra note 105, at 625
(discussing how the inverse-death-knell doctrine was accepted only in the Second Circuit).
145. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2012).
146. § 16(b).
147. The story of § 16 resembles Rule 23(f). At first, courts of appeals found exceptions to the
final judgment rule, allowing interlocutory appeals from orders compelling or refusing to compel
arbitration. See, e.g., Mahlon M. Frankhauser, Arbitration: The Alternative to Securities and
Employment Litigation,50 Bus. LAW. 1333, 1342 (1995). Then, the U.S. Supreme Court stepped in,
preventing interlocutory appeals. Id. at 1342-44. Finally, Congress responded by enacting § 16. Id.
at 1344 & n.92.
148. See Bombardier Corp. v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 333 F.3d 250, 254 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
cf Stephen H. Kupperman & George C. Freeman Iit, Selected Topics in Securities Arbitration:Rule
15c2-2, Fraud,Duress, Unconscionability, Waiver, Class Arbitration, Punitive Damages,Rights of

Review, and Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1547, 1605 (1991) (advocating, based on
the same pro-arbitration policy, an asymmetric standard of review of trial courts' decisions to affirm
or vacate arbitration awards).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol43/iss2/2

26

Lavie: Are Judges Tied to the Past? Evidence from Jurisdiction Cases

ARE JUDGES TIED TO THE PAST?

2014]

struggle to delineate the optimal scope of
areas in which courts
149
appeals.
interlocutory
Thus, contrary to the final judgment tradition, this Article advocates
a broader right to interlocutory review. This mechanism is particularly
useful for interim decisions that are followed by costly adjudication.
Rights to interlocutory review should sometimes be asymmetric, as
mistaken interlocutory decisions often entail different investments of
judicial efforts, depending on the winning party.
Interlocutory review does not have to be complete. Speedy,
unreasoned appellate orders can avoid many of the difficulties that this
Article describes. Nevertheless, it is true that even a moderately broader
right to interlocutory review entails more costs.15° The appropriate
balance between the costs and benefits of interlocutory appeals merits a
separate discussion. The purpose of this Article is to add a new argument
in favor of interlocutory appeals-improving appellate decisionmaking-to the regular array of for-and-against considerations. The
findings in this Article show that larger efforts by the trial court are
associated with a non-trivial distortion in appellate decision-making, as
reversal rates are around five to twenty percentage points lower, in
conservative estimates. 151 With a broader interlocutory review, then,
many appeals that are currently denied would have been accepted.
VI.

ALTERNATIVE READINGS OF THE FINDINGS

A. Rethinking Jurisdiction
The empirical findings are based on the sharp distinction between
jurisdiction determinations and merits adjudication. This Subpart revisits
the thesis of this Article to account for the possibility that the concept of
jurisdiction is not as rigid as the rhetoric of judges implies. Simply
stated, appellate judges may say jurisdiction, but mean something else in
order to achieve a better outcome in each case.
There are circumstances in which appellate court decisions that find
lack of jurisdiction trigger new proceedings in another forum (e.g., state

149. One notable example is the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, which makes remand
orders reviewable: "[A] court of appeals may accept an appeal from an order of a district court
granting or denying a motion to remand a class action to the State court from which it was
removed...." 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). An asymmetric right to reviewmaking only orders denying remand reviewable-may be more important from the perspective of
this Article.
150. See Nagel, supra note 65, at 220, 222.
151. See supraTable 2.
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courts). 52 This consideration might justify affirming jurisdiction where
it does not exist but the result on the merits seems correct, in order to
save prospective judicial resources at the other forum. 51 3 Indeed, litigants
54
sometimes explicitly raise this kind of argument. 1
Do courts of appeals consider prospective judicial resources?
According to judicial rhetoric, the answer is clearly negative.' 55
Moreover, the desire to save future judicial efforts by affirming
156
questionable jurisdiction cannot apply straightforwardly across cases.
There are several distinct, hypothetical scenarios when jurisdiction is
found lacking at the appellate court.' 5 7 The alternative forum can be, for
instance, a state court or a foreign system, and it may seem more
acceptable to burden a foreign legal system with future litigation.'58
Furthermore, the alternative forum might not be available for litigationa statute of limitations, for example, often precludes litigation in the
alternative forum regardless of jurisdiction. 5 9
To the extent appellate judges misuse the concept of jurisdiction to
save prospective judicial expenses in specific cases, such practice will
have obvious costs. It tends to expand jurisdiction in order to save
judicial efforts that were mistakenly spent.' 60 It spawns uncertainty in an

152. See, e.g., Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 581-82 (2004)
(notwithstanding judicial efforts spent in the federal court procedure, the Court remanded to the
state court due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
153. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 76-77 (1996) ("To wipe out the adjudication
postjudgment, and return to the state court.., would impose an exorbitant cost on our dual court
system .. "); cf Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 594-95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[R]igid insistence
on the time-of-filing [diversity jurisdiction] rule ... would mean an almost certain replay of the
case, with, in all likelihood, the same ultimate outcome.").
154. One example in the database is Smith v. American General Life & Accident Insurance Co.,
where the court rejected the plaintiffs argument. 337 F.3d 888, 897 (7th Cir. 2003).
155. See, e.g., id. ("While we are not unsympathetic to [the plaintiffs] situation ... we are
simply not in a position to create federal jurisdiction where it is otherwise lacking.").
156. See Gao, supranote 30, at 2389.
157. See id at 2388-90 (discussing possible alternative scenarios upon dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction).
158. Similarly, it seems more acceptable to encumber state courts, as opposed to federal courts,
with the burden of relitigation. See, e.g., id. at 2388-89 (explaining that in cases that are dismissed
for lack ofjurisdiction, it seems less wasteful to file in state court than federal court).
159. Id. at 2388 & n. 119 ("[I]n many situations, especially where the litigation has gone on for
years, [the assumption that the statute of limitations on the plaintiffs case has not run] is likely a
faulty one.").
160. Cf Smith v. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 888, 896-97 (7th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the court is not in a position to expand jurisdiction where "it is otherwise lacking" just
because the plaintiff has run up a large bill); Del Vecchio v. Conseco, Inc., 230 F.3d 974, 980 (7th
Cir. 2000) (discussing that while courts are sympathetic to the waste of efforts when a case is fully
litigated in the wrong court, subject matter jurisdiction is necessary for a federal court to decide a
case).
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area of law that loathes it. 161 It seems to confuse litigants, as evidenced

by the lower reversal rates of jurisdiction determinations that were
followed by a trial.162 In short, this judicial behavior may achieve just
results in specific cases, but it pays a long-term doctrinal price. As the
Supreme Court emphatically cautions, "incremental benefit is
outweighed by the impact of... an individualized jurisdictional inquiry
on the judicial system's overall capacity to administer justice."'' 63 Indeed,
even if misusing the concept of jurisdiction may achieve broader policy
goals,164 the practice of affirming jurisdiction in aberrant cases that made
it to the merits, though jurisdiction was lacking, advances no such
65
general benefits. 1
In case appellate judges are driven by the desire to achieve a better
outcome in each case at the expense of doctrinal clarity and certainty,
one can think of two directions for reform. First, it may be beneficial to
rethink the concept of jurisdiction, such that judges could indeed deviate
from doctrinal mandates, though in a more transparent way. In some
exceptional cases, then, the appellate court should hold that the
proceedings on the merits in the lower court are not void, even though
jurisdiction was lacking. One can think of several relevant considerations
for such decisions: whether the decision on the merits appears correct;
whether we expect the case to be relitigated in the "true" forum, if this
161. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
618 (1992) ("An important feature of laws regarding form is that they be cheaply accessible and
precisely predictable.").
162. Cf Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial:
Defendants 'Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 125, 130-32, 133 & n.13, 134 (2001) (attempting to
explain why litigants appeal even though few cases are reversed).
163. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 473 (1978).
164. See generally Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction'sNoble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971 (2009)
(discussing the ways in which courts use jurisdiction to further other goals). Frederic M. Bloom
argues that the entire concept of jurisdiction is a "noble lie," which is "devised . .. to secure a set
of... benefits" rather than to deceive. Id. at 974-75. More concretely, Bloom draws on several
Supreme Court precedents to aver that flexible jurisdiction rules allow judicial pragmatism and
express "careful incorporation of more functional concerns," such as the relative expertise of
different forums, impact on judicial workload, and the proper balance of federalism. Id.at 1009.
Nonetheless, Bloom argues, the rigid rhetoric of jurisdiction doctrine is essential. Id. at 1021. It
keeps some degree of formality, guides lower courts, and creates well-defined categories. Id. at
1022-26. In sum, the split between rhetoric and practice, the argument goes, enables the Supreme
Court to "adapt wisely over time," while guiding lower courts and parties, who understand that there
needs to be "careful justification of any jurisdictional deviation." Id at 1024-25.
165. The cases in the database are mundane cases in which appellate judges say one thing and
do another. None of these cases produced a new Supreme Court jurisdiction precedent. What the
data does show is erratic application of jurisdictional doctrines, subject, perhaps, to the irreparable
waste ofjudicial efforts and the need to relitigate the case. Put differently, the "jurisdiction lie" that
this Article reveals is an ex post lie, which stems from the desire to accommodate salient, aberrant
features of specific cases; it has nothing to do with a better design of jurisdiction rules, allegedly
sensitive to federalism concerns and the exigencies of the time.
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forum is available at all; the importance of adjudicating the case in the
appropriate forum; and the severity of the jurisdiction mistake (i.e., the
extent to which parties can plausibly litigate a case in the wrong forum).
Appellate judges, who currently lack complete information regarding
these concerns, should transparently discuss these issues, letting litigants
raise relevant arguments. This approach has several notable benefits.
Particularly, it can save prospective judicial resources and maintain
doctrinal clarity, as appellate courts will not be compelled to expand
jurisdiction in these aberrant cases. This approach also has some
drawbacks-most notably, it publicly affirms, though in exceptional
cases, proceedings without jurisdiction.16
A second approach follows the main policy recommendation of this
Article-interlocutory appeals. Interim review would correct
jurisdictional mistakes before the case proceeds to the merits,
avoiding the need to bend doctrine where the results on the merits
seem reasonable. It would also prevent haphazard expansion of
jurisdiction. Interlocutory appeals can thus lead to more accurate
resolutions of167
jurisdictional questions, as well as greater doctrinal clarity
certainty.
and
Would it be better to rethink the rigid use of the concept
"jurisdiction" to accommodate exceptions when the lower court has
mistakenly adjudicated the case without jurisdiction? Are the additional
costs of interlocutory review worth the benefits of predictable rules of
jurisdiction and more accurate results? Is the balance between potentially
efficient results in individual cases and better rules optimal? These
questions exceed the scope of this Article and are left to future
research. This Article, however, does provide a more comprehensive
view of the costs and benefits of misusing the concept of jurisdiction at
the appellate level.
B. Methodological Concerns
One may argue that other forces drive the observed results. In the
following Subparts, I discuss various methodological issues and their
implications on the foregoing normative discussion.
166. Such an approach may, of course, raise constitutional concerns as well. See, e.g., Gao,
supra note 30, at 2395-2402 (discussing the constitutional argument in support of an American Law
Institute

proposed

rule which would bar subject matter jurisdiction

challenges after the

commencement of trial on the merits in the district court).
167. Cf Dustin E. Buehler, Solving Jurisdiction'sSocial Cost, 89 WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming
2014) (manuscript at 45, 62-63) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review) (advocating, for different

reasons, procedures that ensure that courts "affirmatively adjudicate and resolve all jurisdictional
issues at the outset of litigation").
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1. Selection of Appeals
This study looks at appellate court cases. 168 Litigants are those who
have to trigger appeals. 169 If appealed cases systematically differ from
cases that are not appealed, the results we observe might be biased. Are
cases that ended with a trial on the merits more or less likely to be
appealed? It seems intuitive that heavily invested cases are the hardest
ones, and also more likely to reach appellate review. 170 However, this
does not mean that the underlying jurisdictional resolutions, which are
typically decided at the outset, are different. The underlying
jurisdictional issues are detached from the merits of the case and
assumed to be independent of the main dispute. 171 There can be
a hard case on the merits with an easy underlying jurisdictional
question, and vice versa (a difficult jurisdictional dispute with easily
resolved merits). 72
Other factors mitigate the effect, if any, of sample selection. First,
the regressions control for several variables that plausibly influence the
decision to appeal (examples include the type of the case, the appellant's
identity, and whether interlocutory review was granted). 7 3 Similarly, I
174
ran additional regressions to control for the strength of the merits.
Second, the database includes only genuine jurisdictional challenges-I
excluded cases with frivolous jurisdiction arguments. 175 Thus, even if
litigants excessively appeal jurisdiction resolutions following a trial on
the merits, the database contains only the non-frivolous ones. Likewise, I
ran additional regressions to better rule out non-meritorious
jurisdictional claims, and the results were all the more robust. 1 76 This
168. See supra Part 11I.B.
169. The Appeals Process, USCOURTS.GOV,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/
UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/HowCourtsWork/TheAppealsProcess.aspx (last visited Feb. 15,
2015).
170. Cf George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1984) (attempting to define economic incentives to prefer litigating to settling,
and concluding that "disputes lying close to the decision standard are more likely to be litigated than
disputes lying far from the decision standard"): Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and the
Relationship Between Trial and Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. POL. ECON. 229, 233 (1995) (providing

empirical evidence for Priest and Klein's propositions). By this logic, close cases, which are
presumably those that are more likely to end with a trial, may also be the ones in which losing
litigants appeal more often.
171. See Gao, supranote 30, at 2375.
172. Compare Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 345-46 (1903) (establishing the limits of
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause in Article I of the U.S. Constitution), with Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (determining whether the Alien Tort
Statute, a "strictly jurisdictional" statute, could apply extraterritorially).
173.

See supra Part W.A.

174. See supra Part IV.C.3.b.
175. See supra Part III.B.
176. See supra Part IV.C.3.a.
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discussion suggests that it is not the selection process that drives the
results. Indeed, previous studies that considered appellate
decision-making have concluded that "any selection of cases for appeal
seems overall to
reflect little or no systematic filtering on the basis of
177
case strength."'

A variation of this argument regarding selection of appeals is the
following. Litigants somehow intuit the tendency of appellate judges to
affirm dubious jurisdiction when the trial court proceeds to the merits.
Hence, litigants might adapt by appealing fewer jurisdictional questions
that were followed by a considerable judicial input on the merits.
Similarly, a litigant whose jurisdictional challenge was denied might
push for an interlocutory appeal (though they are generally not
available); 178 when these attempts are unsuccessful, litigants may find
creative ways to avoid a long-and presumably jurisdiction-lackingtrial. 179 Alternatively, litigants can agree, ex ante, to a partial settlement,
gaining immediate review of the most disputed issue.' 80 These caveats
seem appealing. On the other hand, by no means is it self-evident to
attribute perfect information to litigants.' 8' Be that as it may, there is
reason to think that the foregoing strategies cannot explain the observed
results. To the extent that litigants do effectively appeal to a lesser
degree when a jurisdictional question is followed by a trial on the merits,
177. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 162, at 146. Directly modeling the decision to appeal
based on their data, the authors argue that "case selection on appeal functions largely as a random
sampling, rather than a systematic screening." Id. at 148; see also FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION
MAKING INTHE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 147 (2007) ("[L]itigants do not appear to play a major
role in driving juridical decisions.... Litigants are necessary to enable judicial action but they do
not appear to drive the outcome of that judicial action.").
178. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006). The regressions, however, control for interlocutory appeals.
See supra Part IV.A.
179. Indeed, the database includes cases in which one party defaulted after losing on
jurisdictional grounds in order to obtain an immediate appeal. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Shackelford,
478 F.3d 957, 958, 962 (8th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff, whose motion to remand the case to a state
court was denied, voluntarily dismissed her remaining claims, and then appealed. Id. at 962. The
appellate court, indeed, held that jurisdiction was lacking. Id. at 962-64. However, such cases where
litigants default to obtain prompt review are scarce, since, presumably, defaulting entails a
significant risk and a defaulting litigant can only appeal on preliminary grounds.
180. The practice of partial settlements is a relatively recent phenomenon, which can be
explained by the desire to reduce risky and costly trials. In practice, partial settlements may also be
motivated by the parties' desire to obtain immediate interim review, rigid rules of federal procedure
notwithstanding. For practical examples in the context of patent claims, see Geoffrey Gavin &
Matthew Warenzak, Disputed Claim Constructions, PAT. WORLD, Mar. 2009, at 31, 31-32
(discussing the desire for interlocutory appeals to resolve claim construction issues in patent cases,
and the use of stipulated judgments to obtain interlocutory appeals).
181. Note, in this context, that certain circuits and judges, such as Judge Richard Posner and
Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, have constantly shown higher reversal rates, but apparently litigants
fail to adjust their behavior accordingly. For relevant data, see Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43
ARIz. L. REV. 9, 54 (2001). See also Clermont and Eisenberg, supra note 162, at 131-34.
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this tendency would wash out the results-we would observe an
attenuated inclination to affirm jurisdictional decisions that were
followed by heavy judicial investments. If anything, the capacity of
litigants to adjust their decision to appeal means that the results
we observe do not reflect182the full effect of prior judicial efforts on
appellate decision-making.
2. Litigation at the Trial Court
This study focuses on courts of appeals. 183 Perhaps, trial courts'
84
dynamics are driving the results. 1
a. Litigants
Sophisticated litigants who understand the tendency of appellate
courts to affirm jurisdiction may adjust their litigation strategy at the trial
court and influence, to some extent, the quality of the district court's
jurisdictional determinations. 185 Litigants may invest more in resolving
jurisdiction where they expect lengthy litigation on the merits, in order to
avoid paying potentially redundant legal expenses. Likewise,
jurisdictional arguments can be raised time and again during trial. Thus,
litigants who previously lost their jurisdictional challenge can raise an
improved one when they understand how costly the trial is. 186 On the
other hand, jurisdiction is typically a legal question, which judges ought
to raise sua sponte, even when litigants failed to do so. 187 The capacity of
litigants to influence the jurisdictional ruling is questionable. In addition,
these arguments imply that litigants with larger stakes produce better
jurisdictional resolutions at the trial court. However, I found no such
correlation between the value of the case and affirming the trial court's
jurisdiction. 188 These findings suggest that litigants' behavior cannot

182. For an elaborated and formal discussion of this logic, see Daniel Klerman & Yoon-Ho
Alex Lee, Inferences from Litigated Cases, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 209-14 (2014). Daniel Klerman
and Yoon-Ho Lee show that, under broad categories of cases and fairly general assumptions, the
capacity of litigants to litigate (or, in our case, appeal) selectively does not prevent inferences from
litigated (or appealed) cases; if anything, this selection process weakens the observed results.
183. See supra Part III.B.
184. See infra Part VI.B.2.a-b.
185. Cf supraPart VI.B.1.
186. Cf Gao, supranote 30, at 2379-80. One can further argue that appellate judges respond to
anticipated litigants' behavior. Hence, appellate courts might be inclined to affirm the trial court's
rulings on jurisdiction when they are followed by a lengthy trial, in order to induce litigants, ex ante,
to invest more in resolving jurisdiction.
187. See supra Part III.A.
188. See supra Part IV.C.3.b.
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fully account for appellate courts' tendency not to reverse the more
efforts trial courts spent on the case.
b. Trial Judges
Trial judges, one may argue, are the driving force behind the
results. Anticipating a long trial following a jurisdictional determination
may result in trial judges reacting differently. Particularly, when judges
expect a trial, they can aim at improving their jurisdictional resolution.
As they tend to suffer from heavy dockets, 189 district judges are likely
more careful not to mistakenly uphold jurisdiction, and then proceed to a
protracted adjudication. According to this logic, an observed correlation
between reversals of jurisdictional questions and judicial input on the
merits represents trial judges' capacity to generate better jurisdictional
determinations when complicated trials on the merits are expected. The
corollary-argument is that district judges would be less careful when
they mistakenly deny jurisdiction, as, in this case, an error would result
in fewer cases to adjudicate.' 90
To the extent this argument is taken as true, it essentially presents a
different interpretation of the findings. The basic results persist:
preliminary issues that are followed by heavy judicial investments on the
merits are scrutinized differently than identical issues that are followed
by little judicial investment. Indeed, the main prescriptive message of
this Article-that interlocutory appeals subtly improve judicial decisionmaking-remains the same under this alternative interpretation. To the
extent the empirical findings are driven by trial judges' behavior,
interlocutory review can reduce judicial incentives to act strategically in
the face of prospective, costly adjudication. 19 Indeed, it was observed
that "[a] realistic possibility of [interlocutory] review ... may
spur
' 92
district courts to take [interlocutory] decisions more seriously.'
Regardless, one may wonder whether this description of trial
judges' strategies is correct. In fact, an opposite strategy is plausible:
district judges predict appellate judges' tendency to affirm-for

189. See, e.g., Jordan Smith, Docket Is Full, But Judges Are Few, AUSTIN CHRON., July 27,
2012, http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2012-07-27/docket-is-full-but-judges-are-few.
190. Put differently, for trial judges, a false-positive error (upholding jurisdiction) is more
costly than a false-negative error (denying jurisdiction).
191. This does not mean that interlocutory appeals are always valuable; rather, they constrain
the freedom of trial judges to treat identical issues differently. There may be reasons to nonetheless
allow trial judges such control over their cases.
192.

WORKING PAPERS, supra note 135, at 411; see also Solimine & Hines, supra note 109, at

1565. This and other concerns led to the 1998 amendment that permits, through Rule 23(f),
interlocutory appeals from orders certifying class actions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
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whatever reason-when large, irreparable efforts are invested at the trial
193
level. In order to maximize their leisure and reduce odds of reversal,
in anticipation of appellate courts' inclination to affirm heavily invested
decisions, trial judges might, consciously or not, change their behavior in
response. In particular, trial judges may reduce the quality of their
jurisdictional determinations if extensive litigation is likely to follow. If
this effect exists, it likely mitigates the observed phenomenon. At1 this
94
point, it is hard to safely conclude which strategies, if any, dominate.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This study uses the distinction between jurisdiction and merits
adjudication to reveal a surprising phenomenon: appellate judges take
into account irrelevant efforts made by trial judges, and the more efforts
trial judges invested in the case, the less often appellate judges
reverse.195 Some appeals that should be accepted are denied. The
findings are non-trivial in size and robust under various specifications.
This phenomenon has far-reaching implications, and this Article
focuses on one simple procedural modification. A broader right to
interlocutory appeals would rectify judges' propensity to take into
account past decisions, and, hence, improve appellate decision-making.
This Article, then, adds a new perspective to the array of traditional
arguments for and against the final judgment rule.
There are several reasons to be cautious about the findings.
Particularly, the findings may express appellate judges' perspectives
regarding jurisdictional questions and/or trial judges' strategic behavior.
But even under these alternative readings, the main prescriptive
implication of this Article-broader interlocutory review-remains
valuable. While this Article establishes a strong correlation between past
efforts and reluctance to reverse, there is room for further research.
Different study designs might better trace the origins of this phenomenon
and rule out alternative explanations.1 96 In this sense, this Article is a
first step in an unexplored direction.

193. Cf Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 14-15 (1993).
194. One can further argue that circuit courts react to trial judges' strategic behavior. When
trial judges uphold jurisdiction and then move on to a lengthy trial, they signal that they have gotten
a better jurisdictional determination. Appellate judges' behavior, however, depends on their beliefs
regarding trial judges' strategic behavior. This discussion exceeds the scope of this Article.
195. See supra Part lV.B.
196. One potential methodology is conducting an experiment and challenging participants with
hypothetical situations. Ideally, such experiments can be administered on federal judges. Cf Guthrie
et al., supranote 23, at 784-87.
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APPENDIX

A. Logistic Regressions: The Effect of a Trial at the Lower Court
The following are the results of seven logistic regressions, in which
"JURISDICTION" is the dependent variable. It equals 1 when the court of
appeals affirms the district court's jurisdiction, and 0 when jurisdiction is
reversed. The independent variable is the procedural posture.
Regression (1): This is the basic regression. It includes all cases in
the database. The independent variable, TRIAL, indicates whether there
was a bench or jury trial on the merits at the district court or not (1 and 0,
respectively). This regression also includes circuit court fixed effects.
Regression (2): Includes all cases in the database. The independent
variables represent the procedural posture in which the case ended
(MOTION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BENCH TRIAL, or JURY TRIAL).

Regression (3): Same as Regression (1), but includes district court
fixed effects instead of circuit court fixed effects.
Regression (4): Same as Regression (1), but the database includes
only federal question cases.
Regression (5): Same as Regression (2), but the database includes
only federal question cases.
Regression (6): Same as Regression (1), but summary orders are
excluded from the database.
Regression (7): Same as Regression (1), but the database only
includes decisions in which the phrase "subject matter jurisdiction"
appears in the summary or synopsis.
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Table A. 1: Procedural Posture and Reversal Rates of Jurisdiction
Questions: All Observations (Regressions (1)-(3))
Explanatory
Variables
Trial (Bench/Jury)
Procedural
Posture:
Summary
Judgment
Bench Trial

(1)
Coefficient
(StandardError)
0.88 (0.44) _

Type of Case:
Civil Rights
Criminal
Civil
Public Law
Unanimous
Opinion
Nonconsolidated
Non-Class Action

(3)
Coefficient
(StandardError)
1.03 (0.50)'"

0.15(0.28)
1.39 (0.74)*
0.59 (0.54)

Jury Trial

Interlocutory
Appeal

(2)
Coefficient
(StandardError)

-0.72 (0.38)*

-0.65 (0.40)*

-0.72 (0.43)*

0.14 (0.63)
2.75 (1.22)-0.62 (0.59)
0.58 (0.63)
0.10 (0.44)

0.54 (0.6Q
2.79 (1.23)-0.54 (0.61)
0.51 (0.65)
0.12 (0.43)

0.44 (0.69)
3.73 (l.14)..
0.91 (0.68)
0.81 (0.70)
0.23 (0.52)

-0.18 (0.31)
-0.85 (0.48)"

-0.17 (0.32)
-0.88 (0.48)-

-0.19 (0.34)
-0.77 (0.50)

-0.70 (0.50)
-0.16 (0.48)ta)
-0.04 (0.06)
Yes

-0.68 (0.50)
-0.16 (0.49)
-0.04 (0.06)
Yes

-0.65 (0.53)
-0.26 (0.54)
0.05 (0.25)
No

No

No

Yes

Yes
1.11 (1.05)
367
10.83%

Yes
1.11 (1.05)
367
11.11%

Yes
1.26 (1.19)
352
16.15%

Appellant:

Plaintiff
Defendant
Log(Distance)
Circuit Fixed
Effects
District Fixed
Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R Squared

(a)-the joint effect of "appellant is plaintiff' and "appellant is
defendant" has a p-value of 10% in Regression (1).
*-indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
**-indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
***-indicates statistical significance at the 1%level.
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Table A.2: Procedural Posture and Reversal Rates of Jurisdiction
Questions: Subsamples (Regressions (4)-(7))
(4)
Explanatory
Variables
Trial (Bench/Jury)
Procedural
Posture:
Summary
Judgment
Bench Trial
Jury Trial
Interlocutory
Appeal
Type of Case:
Civil Rights
Criminal
Civil
Public Law
Unanimous
Upinio
Opinion
Nonconsolidated
Non-Class Action

Coefficient
(Standard
Error)
1.96 (0.92)-

(5)
Coefficient
(Standard
Error)

(6)
Coefficient
(Standard
Error)
0.95 (0.46)"

(7)
Coefficient
(Standard
Error)
2.85 (0.85)".

-0.74 (0.39)"

0.15 (0.85)

-1.83 (1.00)"
-M

-0.19 (0.48)
1.59 (1.29)
-0.85 (0.73)

2.18 (1.18)'
-0.88 (0.75)

-0.30 (1.98)
a)
-1.71 (1.76)
-1.36 (1.81)

-0.17 (2.06)
-1.59 (1.81)
-1.25 (1.86)

0.11(0.64
2.71 (1.22)0.58 (0.60)
0.68 (0.64)

0.92 (0.74)

0.96 (0.74)

0.08 (0.43)

0.24 (0.99)

-0.57 (0.54)
-1.15

-0.60 (0.54)
09
(0.61)*'

-0.13 (0.33)
-0.77 (0.50)
0.7(05)

-1.97 068
-0.27 (0.70)
-02 (.0

-0.85 .'2)
-0.30
(0.51)(c)

0.09(1.11)

S~~~~(0.60)*(b)

-w

"

-0.20 (0.83)
-0.56 (1.01)

Appellant:
Plaintiff

0.48 (0.85)

0.55 (0.86)

Defendant

1.16 (0.85)

1.21 (0.88)

-0.06 (0.12)
Yes

-0.06 (0.12)
Yes

-0.04 (0.06)
Yes

-0.04 (0.13)
Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes
1.02 (2.34)
135
17.63%

Yes
0.85 (2.45)
135
17.78%

Yes
1.21 (1.08)
341
10.85%

Yes
1.82 (1.67)
128
26.22%

Log(Distance)
Circuit Fixed
Effects
District Fixed
Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R Squared

0.82 (1.15)

(a)-the sample for Regressions (4), (5), and (7) does not include
criminal cases.
(b)-the joint effect of consolidated cases and class actions has a p-value
of 5% in Regressions (4) and (5).
(c)-the joint effect of "appellant is plaintiff" and "appellant is
defendant" has a p-value of 10% in Regression (6).
*-indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
**-indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
* **-indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
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B. Multinomial Regression: Remands
The following are the results of two multinomial regressions.
is the dependent variable. It equals 1 when the court of
appeals affirms the district court's jurisdiction, 0 when it reverses, and 2
when the jurisdictional question is remanded to the trial court.
The regression includes all the cases in the database; column (1) is
the effect on reversing jurisdiction; column (2) is the effect on
remanding; and base outcome is affirming.
"JURISDICTION"

Table B: Procedural Posture and Reversal Rates of Jurisdiction
Questions: Multinomial Regression
Explanatory Variables
Trial (bench/jury)
Interlocutory Appeal
Type of Case:
Civil Rights
Criminal
Civil
Public Law
Unanimous Opinion
Nonconsolidated
Non-Class Action
Appellant:
Plaintiff
Defendant
Log(Distance)
Year Fixed Effects
Circuit Fixed Effects
Constant
Observations
Pseudo R Squared

(2)
Coefficient
(StandardError)
2.15 (0.88)"
2.43 (1.04)-'

(1)
Coefficient
(StandardError)
-0.79 (0.45)"
0.91 (0.39)-"
-0.19 (0.64)
-2.71 (1.22)
-0.57 (0.60)
-0.53 (0.64)
0.03 (0.44)
0.23 (0.32)
0.62 (0.50)

-17.12 (-)
-17.13 (-)
18.67 (-)
18.51 (-)
20.84 (-)
1.08 (0.73
-2.11 (0.84)*""

0.57 (0.52)
-0.06 (0.51)
0.04 (0.06)
Yes
Yes
-0.87 (1.06)

-1.85 (0.87)"
-3.87 (1.09)'.
0.01 (0.15)
Yes
Yes
-38.95 (-)
367
18.58%

*-indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
**-indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
* **-indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
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